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ABSTRACT 
 
The present study examined the moderating role of bargaining structure that is 
positive and negative bargaining zone, on the impact of positive affect on decision 
making in negotiation. While prior research on positive affect and negotiation showed 
that positive affect helped negotiators use more cooperative strategies and reach more 
integrative outcomes, this study found that there exists a boundary condition for the 
impact to hold, according to the bargaining structure of the negotiation. Since the time 
and the energy invested in the negotiation are considered as the cost of negotiation, 
different structure of bargaining zone introduces different needs to negotiators to 
balance the benefits and the costs. 
Positive and neutral affect was manipulated by showing a series of pictures to 
the participants and making them to write down their associations with the picture. 
Then participants conducted a two-party negotiation which seemed to be distributive 
but which had integrative potential. Results showed that negotiators in the positive 
affect condition reached more integrative solutions than negotiators in the control 
condition only when they faced a negative bargaining zone, but not when faced a 
positive bargaining zone. Negotiators with whom positive affect was induced guessed 
the propriety issues of the other party better in the negative bargaining zone condition 
as well. Also, they arrived at an agreement significantly faster and perceived the other 
negotiator as more cooperative than negotiators with neutral affect. Consistent with 
prior research on the impact of positive affect on cognitive flexibility, negotiators in 
the positive affect condition were able to distinguish when the efforts to reach an 
integrative outcome is necessary and worthwhile, thus balance the benefit and the cost 
of the negotiation. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
Affect influences the planning and execution of complex, elaborate social 
encounters in organizations, such as negotiation. In negotiations, affect can influence 
the perception and behaviors of negotiators in terms of how they are expressed, how 
they are experienced, and how they are used strategically. Since Neal and Northcraft 
(1991) pointed out affect as one of the underexamined area of research in dyadic 
negotiation, the role of affect has been studied by many negotiation researchers 
(Barry, Fulmer, & Van Kleef, 2004; Thompson, Nadler, & Kim, 1999). 
Prior research has focused on the intrapersonal effects of affect in negotiation; 
the influence of a negotiator’s emotional state on his or her own behavior. Positive 
affect has been shown to increase concession making (Baron, 1990), stimulate creative 
problem solving (Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki,1987), increase joint gains (Kramer, 
Newton, & Pommerenke,1993; Carnevale & Isen, 1986), reduce the use of contentious 
tactics (Carnevale & Isen, 1986), and increase the use of cooperative negotiation 
strategies (Forgas, 1998).  
On the other hand, negative affect has been shown to decrease initial offers 
(Baron, Fotin, Frei, Hauver, & Shack, 1990), promote the rejection of ultimatum 
offers (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996), and increase the use of competitive strategies 
(Forgas, 1998). Angry negotiators also achieved fewer joint gains without successfully 
claiming more value for themselves. They expressed a sequence of retaliatory 
impulses and behaviors and showed decreased desire to work together in the future 
(Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia, 1997; Allred, 1999). 
Recently, several scholars have emphasized the importance of the interpersonal 
effects of emotions in negotiations and studied how an individual’s affective 
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experiences influence not only the individuals but also their counterparts. Since 
emotions convey information about how one feels about things (Ekman, 1993), about 
one’s social intentions (Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972), and about one’s 
orientation toward other people (Knutson, 1996), they have very important social 
functions and consequences. Van Kleef et al.(2004) showed that negotiators with an 
angry opponent placed lower demands and made larger concessions than did those 
with a non-emotional opponent, whereas negotiators with a happy opponent placed 
higher demands and made smaller concessions. This social impact of anger and 
happiness on negotiation behavior generally suggests that anger triggers behavioral 
adjustment by serving as a negative reinforcement of other people’s behavior to 
induce more concessions, whereas happiness triggers smaller concessions by serving 
as a positive reinforcement of other people’s behavior.  
Together with the social functions of emotions, the interpersonal effect of 
emotion was also used to explain a process of strategic decision making on the part of 
emotion-receiving negotiators. Negotiators used their opponent’s emotion to infer the 
location of his or her limits and subsequently used this information to make a 
counteroffer. In other words, negotiators with a happy opponent judged the opponent’s 
limit to be low, felt no need to concede to avoid impasse, and accordingly placed high 
demands and made small concessions. When faced with an angry opponent, 
negotiators estimated the opponent’s limits to be high, thus placed low demands and 
made large concessions to avoid costly impasse (Van Kleef et al., 2004). 
Given this ample research on the effects of interpersonal and intrapersonal 
affect on negotiation, this study focuses on the moderating role of bargaining structure 
on the relationship between affect and decision making in negotiations. While the 
terms emotion, mood and affect have often been used interchangeably in prior 
research, affect is used here to include both long-term influence of mild mood and 
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discrete and transient emotional states. Most previous findings on interpersonal affect 
suggest that positive affect provides more constructive basis for collaborative problem 
solving in integrative tasks (Barry, Fulmer, & Van Kleef, 2004). In contrast, Van 
Kleef et al. (2004) focused on interpersonal effects of affect using distributive tasks, 
and discovered that expression of anger could be a more effective strategy than 
expression of happiness. They concluded that anger appears to be more conducive to 
claiming value in distributive negotiations, whereas happiness appears to be more 
beneficial in integrative negotiations. However, prior research utilized either 
integrative or distributive tasks in the study, which made it difficult to find out the 
potential moderating role of bargaining structure on the impact of affect.  
Bargaining structure in general means whether the negotiation is integrative task 
or distributive. However, these two categories are not mutually exclusive. Since 
negotiators are able to find out additional issues to add to the pre-existing distributive 
structure so that they can arrive at integrative outcomes, it is difficult to conclude that 
all distributive tasks are purely distributive in nature. Also, in distributive negotiations, 
negotiators face two types of bargaining structure, positive and negative bargaining 
zone. A positive bargaining zone refers to the condition where each negotiator’s 
aspiration level and reservation point are overlapping over a range of prices or other 
issues at stake. A negative bargaining zone exists when there is no overlapping range 
of prices or issues at stake, and this prohibits the negotiator from reaching satisfactory 
distributive outcomes. Therefore, it is possible for negotiators having positive 
bargaining zone to reach an outcome easier than those with negative bargaining zone.   
Considering this difference in bargaining structure, the main issue with prior 
findings on the effects of affect in negotiation is the moderating role of bargaining 
structure. Since most intrapersonal effects studies employed integrative negotiation 
tasks, while interpersonal effects studies utilized distributive negotiation tasks, the 
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moderating role of bargaining structure on the impact of affect on negotiations has 
been remained unclear. The perception of bargaining structure whether it is 
distributive or integrative may allow certain subsequent behaviors of negotiators in 
one task or not in the other. For example, the integrative potential of the task perceived 
by a negotiator may create a positive affective state even before the negotiation starts. 
In contrast, distributive negotiations with negative bargaining zone, negotiators may 
experience difficulty during the process of reaching agreement as they assume the 
interests of each other to be incompatible.   
To examine the role of bargaining structure, this study manipulated the type of 
bargaining zone: positive and negative in a distributive task, while manipulating 
intrapersonal affect: positive vs. neutral control. In prior research findings, the focus of 
discussion has been on whether the positive or negative affect can help negotiators 
reach better and efficient outcomes. By taking account of the potential moderating 
impact of bargaining structure, the meaning of better and efficient negotiation 
outcome should be reconsidered. In negotiations, a negotiator’s prior goal should be to 
maximize his or her benefit in a given situation. When there is integrative potential, 
negotiators who try to realize the potential could reach mutually beneficial outcomes 
from an expanded pie. However, to realize the integrative potential, negotiators should 
try hard to expand the pie first before dividing the pie. Since negotiation takes time 
and energy, and arriving at an integrative solution takes more time and energy, it is not 
always the main goal of negotiators to reach integrative outcomes. For example, when 
a positive bargaining zone exists, negotiators might find the distributive solution easier 
as compared to those with a negative bargaining zone. In such a case, the effort to 
arrive at integrative outcomes may not be worthwhile as much as it would be in the 
negative bargaining zone context. This different value attached to the effort to reach 
an integrative outcome can be considered as the outcome of bargaining structure, and 
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the present study will focus on how it moderates the effect of positive affect on 
negotiation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Theoretical Background 
Integrative potential in different negotiation tasks 
In prior research on the effects of affect on negotiation behavior, the bargaining 
structure of the tasks used in the studies has varied from an ultimatum game to mixed-
motive integrative bargaining. Carnevale and Isen (1986) utilized an integrative 
bargaining task in which each negotiator was assigned to the role of buyer and seller 
who had profit schedules that allowed them to achieve high profits by exchanging 
concessions on their low-profit items. Using this type of task, the degree of joint 
benefits was measured as variables showing the quality of negotiation outcomes. The 
higher the joint outcome was, the more integrative the outcome was. This type of task 
allowing negotiators to use logrolling strategies (i.e. trading off their items based on 
different priorities), turning distributive negotiation into integrative negotiation by 
detecting different priority on the different issues, has been used in other negotiation 
studies to determine the outcome as distributive or integrative.  
Baron (1990) used a negotiation task that involved decision making between 
two negotiators on how much of $1,000,000 they would try to attain for their 
department and how many of position cuts they would try to induce their opponent to 
accept. He measured variables including final offers to the opponent (accomplice) 
with respect to funds and position cuts, the number of concessions made with respect 
to each issue, and the total size of concessions. Since this was mainly distributive task, 
the integrative potential of the task was not the main focus of the study. Pillutla and 
Murnighan (1996) used ultimatum games with no integrative potential, and the 
rejection of the ultimatum offer was their main dependent variable. Forgas (1998) 
asked happy, neutral and sad participants to select a course for a new curriculum from 
a tentative list of new courses, which was a purely distributive task, through either an 
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informal, interpersonal or formal, inter-group negotiation. In order to examine the 
interpersonal effect of emotion, a programmed opponent (computer) was used as a 
behavioral stimulus (Van Kleef et al., 2001) to participants, and their affective 
responses together with degree of concessions and estimation of the partner’s limit 
were measured.  
These variances of bargaining structures are considered to have an impact on the 
affective responses of negotiators. The existence of integrative potential, the number 
of issues negotiators have to deal with, the number of contingencies involved, and the 
various weights assigned to each issue, make the negotiation task more complex than 
single-issue bargaining. With more complex negotiation tasks, negotiators come to 
experience a higher cognitive load which might confound the effect of affect. Unless 
researchers systemically partial out the impact of task complexity as a potential 
moderator, research results cannot be coherently synthesized as accumulated 
knowledge on the relationship between affect and negotiation. Therefore, this study 
employed the simplest type of negotiation task: single-issue bargaining with a positive 
or negative bargaining zone. By examining the impact of affect with this less complex 
task, the influence of affect and the moderating role of bargaining structure (positive 
vs. negative bargaining zone) can be more clearly interpreted. In addition, although 
one single distributive issue is seemingly the main focus of the negotiation, adding 
other issues to the negotiation table is possible, as in many other negotiation tasks with 
integrative potential. The virtue of this task is that while there is always integrative 
potential, the impact of a positive or negative bargaining zone could be analyzed in 
relation to the realization and achievement of integrative outcomes.   
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The mechanism of the impact of positive affect on negotiation  
Previous research has shown that individuals can overcome their cognitive 
barriers when positive affect is induced. Such individuals tend to improve integration 
of information, creative problem solving, decision making, and cognitive organization. 
(Isen, 1984, 1987; Isen & Daubman, 1984; Isen , Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987; Isen, 
Niedenthal, & Cantor, 1992) This study attempts to examine the impact of positive 
affect on the decision making process in a negotiation context. Positive affect induced 
before the negotiation practice is expected to make individuals more flexible in their 
thinking and behavior, thus leading them to overcome common mistakes found among 
negotiators and making them able to reach mutually better outcomes. Since 
negotiation is an affectively laden process, different types of emotions can be induced 
through a series of interactions. This study specifically examines the effect of positive 
affect induced before the negotiation since individual judgment in the initial phase of 
negotiation has been confirmed to be important in shaping the frame of the 
negotiation. 
Negotiator’s perception of the cooperativeness of the partner 
Since the process of negotiation begins with each negotiator’s expectations 
about the negotiation, how the individual negotiators define and create the negotiation 
game can change the nature of the game and the participants’ behavior. Brandenburger 
and Nalebuff (1996) argued that how competitors define the game may be more 
important than the moves they make within the game. The understanding of 
participants’ definition of the game is beyond the understanding of structural features 
which are inherent in a given game. By focusing on the individual framework of the 
game, we can look at possible factors that may facilitate or hinder the decision-making 
process. 
  9 
 
 
Thompson and Hastie (1990) directly measured individual perceptions of a 
bargaining structure and found that the majority of negotiators assumed their interests 
were strictly opposed to those of the other party. This assumption held across all the 
various issues in the negotiation, even in cases where the two parties had identical and 
compatible interests. They also found that individuals who modified their initial 
perceptions, or mental models, did so immediately at the onset of the interaction; 
otherwise fixed assumptions tended to persist throughout the negotiation. The 
researchers concluded that fixed-pie biases result in a predictable outcome that fails to 
reflect integrative potentials. Their finding suggested the possibility that the impact of 
positive affect that is induced before a negotiation starts can influence negotiators’ 
cognition in the early process of negotiation. This may change the negotiators’ mental 
models from seeing the game as competitive and distributive to seeing it as 
integrative. 
As negotiation is inevitably an interaction between the negotiators, the 
dynamics of interaction also affect the decision making process. De Dreu et al.(1995) 
found that a negotiator’s behavior is influenced by the other party’s gain-loss frame. 
The focal negotiator sends messages that communicate the held frame. The responding 
negotiator, in return, sends messages adopting this frame. This mutual influence holds 
primarily when the adopting party has a gain rather than a loss frame. Here, individual 
negotiators must make an initial decision about whether the frame that the other party 
seems to hold in the message is the one that benefits them before sending a message 
adopting that frame.  
Research on the role of emotion in negotiation has found that the frame of the 
negotiation that individuals hold can be affected by positive emotions. Carnevale and 
Isen (1986) found that a positive mood tends to enhance negotiators’ ability to achieve 
integrative gains. Forgas (1998) also showed that negotiators with positive affect 
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formulated more cooperative and integrative action plans than participants in neutral 
or negative affect states, and that they actually behaved more cooperatively and were 
more willing to make and reciprocate deals than were those in a negative mood. 
Furthermore, they also produced more successful negotiation outcomes. 
Therefore, it is assumed that in the early stage of a negotiation, negotiators’ 
attitudes towards the negotiation can change in the direction of cooperative group 
decision-making when positive affect is induced. This paper argues that negotiators 
who are in a positive mood will change their gain-loss frame into a more potentially 
integrative one, so that they can consider the other party as more cooperative, than will 
those in neutral condition (Hypothesis 1). 
Perspective taking through information sharing 
Negotiation can be seen as group decision making process among two or more 
negotiators. Therefore, the difficulties of group decision making in reaching creative 
outcomes also apply to negotiations in which creative integrative outcomes are 
required. Constraints on group processes come from incomplete communication of 
information. Although the key to divergent thinking is to communicate information, 
groups often fail to do so (Hollingshead, 1996; McLeod, Baron, Marti, &Yoon, 1997; 
Stasser, Stewart, & Wittenbaum, 1995; Stasser & Titus, 1985, 1987). Group members’ 
orientation towards reaching a consensus or obvious compromise choice strengthens 
the tendency to forgo extensive discussion; thus, their unique information is not likely 
to be shared. The common knowledge effect (Gigone & Hastie, 1993, 1996) represents 
the phenomenon that decisions based on prior preferences will reflect what members 
know in common more than what individuals know uniquely. Therefore, discussion 
within the group may be dominated by common information. Stasser and Birchmeier 
(2003) also pointed out two major cognitive obstacles in decision making processes: 
concentration on common information and its substantial effects on final outcomes. 
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Members in a group tend to concentrate on common information shared in the initial 
discussion, and they experience difficulty in retrieving memory and sharing unique 
information that is crucial for generating creative outcomes. Negotiators are also likely 
to concentrate on the common information they shared in the early stage of negotiation 
and fail to share unique information that is important to reach integrative outcomes. 
To overcome the weaknesses of group processes, individual negotiators have to 
overcome their cognitive barriers first. Positive affect is assumed to help individuals 
overcome these barriers at the individual level. Therefore, people in a positive affect 
condition will be more able than those in a control condition to overcome their 
difficulties to share information with each other about their respective unique interests 
(Hypothesis 2). 
Despite all those difficulties raised in group decision making, interaction within 
a group may also offer individuals substantial benefits, such as the possibility of 
perspective-taking. Smith (2003) suggested that one should take the perspectives of 
other individuals in order to overcome the fixation effects on the individual level. 
Fixation refers to something that blocks or impedes the successful completion of 
various types of cognitive operations, such as those involved in remembering, solving 
problems, and generating creative ideas. It takes the form of typical thinking, implicit 
assumptions, and reliance on recent experiences. By considering the perspective of 
others, individuals can overcome these difficulties. Several cognitive models presented 
in the research also imply the potential benefit of group work in that the ability of 
individuals to generate ideas can be enhanced by the number of stimuli coming from 
interaction with others in a group (Paulus, Brown, & Ortega, 1999; Nijstad, Stroebe, 
Lodewijkx, 2002). When individuals understand others’ perspectives and generate 
more ideas through exposures to such information, cognitive barriers become easier to 
overcome.  
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The induction of positive affect can change individuals’ frames of negotiation in 
the early stage of the game and help them overcome individual cognitive barriers, thus 
facilitating perspective-taking and information sharing in the group decision-making 
process. When negotiators overcome the fixation effects on the initial contentious 
frame of the game and modify the frame into a more integrative one, they will try to 
use cooperative strategies to reach outcomes that benefit both parties.  
Information sharing, especially information about their interests, regarding not 
only the single major issue but also several other issues in the situation, will be chosen 
as a cooperative strategy. It will be more effective when negotiators are able to see the 
relevance of information to the negotiation from others’ interests as well as their own 
interests. Creativity researchers have highlighted the importance of the number and the 
breadth of cognitive elements (Langley and Jones, 1988; Sternberg, 1988b). These 
elements enable people to have greater variation in idea possibilities, expanding the 
pool of unusual associations from which the final option can be chosen. Based on the 
degree of information sharing, negotiators are also able to understand the other’s point 
of view, and can, therefore make efficient trade-offs among issues to arrive at 
integrative solutions (Hypothesis 3). 
Integrative outcomes as the result of creative thinking  
Having an integrative framework and understanding the other person’s 
perspective through information sharing are necessary conditions for reaching 
integrative outcomes. Individual negotiators should also try harder to determine how 
their mutual interests can be met at lower costs through their information sharing and 
option generating processes. These processes require individual creativity that can 
broaden each negotiator’s scope of information and lead to options that are beyond 
distributive outcomes. Therefore, the integrative outcomes in the negotiation can be 
considered outcomes of creativity.  
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Creativity is generally defined as the production of novel, useful ideas or 
problem solutions. It refers to both the process of idea generation and the actual idea 
(Amabile, 1983; Sternberg, 1988a; Weisberg, 1988). From this understanding of 
creativity, we can consider integrative negotiations as an example of achieving 
creative outcomes that involves activities such as recognizing various options, 
convincing others of their quality, and overcoming obstacles to implementing them. 
While individual negotiators may suffer from cognitive difficulties such as fixation, or 
the constraining effect of initial ideas, research on affect suggests that positive affect 
can help overcoming individual cognitive barriers. Isen (1999a, 1999b) proposed a 
link between positive affect and creativity, emphasizing three primary effects of 
positive affect on cognitive activity. First of all, positive affect makes additional 
cognitive material available for processing, thus increasing the number of elements for 
potential association. Secondly, directly related to the decrease of the fixation effect, 
positive affect leads people to more complex cognitive contexts and broadens the 
range of elements relevant to the problem. Thirdly, as a result of these effects, positive 
affect increases cognitive flexibility, thus unusual associations can be made.  
In addition, sharing unique information allows one to see novel aspects of a 
problem; thus, negotiators can increase the possibility of reaching creative outcomes. 
As participants generally expect negotiation to be distributive in nature, they tend to 
try to achieve the best possible distributive outcome. When they are able to share 
unique information, however, they can look at unusual possibilities to draw an 
integrative outcome from a negotiation. In the negotiation context, when each 
negotiator takes the other party’s perspective and shares more information, all parties 
can benefit and become creative in generating options. Since integrative negotiation 
depends fundamentally on parties’ ability to trade issues with each other (Froman & 
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Cohen 1970; Walton & Mackersie, 1965), negotiators who can overcome obstacles to 
share information are more likely to reach integrative outcomes 
Therefore, we can assume that negotiators in whom positive affect is induced 
will be more able than negotiators who have not experiences positive affect to 
overcome individual cognitive barriers. It can be shown by testing if negotiators can 
achieve creative outcomes given the limited information shared during the negotiation 
(Hypothesis 4a). 
Time and energy as cost of negotiation: moderating role of bargaining structure 
The goal of group decision-making is to agree on one of several decision 
options. Therefore, group decision making is partly a convergent process. Milliken, 
Bartel and Kurtzberg (2003) suggested that while divergent thinking is necessary for 
creative idea generation, convergent thinking is important for selection and 
implementation of the final outcome in the operational phase. Negotiators also face the 
same set of limits. While they should try to persuade the other party and discuss the 
options that can possibly benefit both of them, they must reach an agreement at a 
certain point. In many cases, time and energy involved in the negotiation process are 
also regarded as part of the costs. Therefore, reaching an agreement within a given 
time frame is another important element of negotiation.  
Consideration of the importance of convergent process and costs of negotiation 
raises the questions of what is a better and efficient decision in a negotiation context. 
As discussed earlier in this thesis, the moderating role of bargaining structure can be 
related to the issue. Because discovering integrative solutions takes more time and 
energy, it is not always in the best interest of negotiator to reach integrative outcomes. 
When there exists a positive bargaining zone, negotiators might find satisfactory 
distributive solutions if they exchange information about their zone of possible 
agreement. In such a case, the integrative potential may be considered as less crucial 
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than that exist within negative bargaining zone context, so reaching a distributive 
agreement within a positive bargaining zone can be considered efficient and better 
decision. In contrast, when faced with a negative bargaining zone, negotiators have no 
other option but to walk out of the negotiation without an agreement, unless they 
discovered integrative options by adding additional issues to the table. Therefore, the 
effort to find out integrative potential and to create integrative options is necessary for 
negotiators to balance out their costs and benefits in a negotiation with negative 
distributive bargaining zone.   
It has been shown that people with positive affect are better at recognizing 
multiple goals and reaching a balance between their intrinsic and extrinsic motivation 
than those without positive affect (Isen & Reeve, 2005). Although we cannot examine 
motivational factors directly during negotiations, recognition of the group goal 
(reaching an agreement) and balance between negotiation outcomes and costs can be 
indirectly examined by looking at whether negotiators agree on a solution in a given 
time. Since an integrative outcome is more crucial in a negative bargaining zone 
context, negotiators with positive affect, who can recognize multiple goals, would try 
harder to reach integrative outcomes when faced with a negative bargaining zone than 
when faced with a positive bargaining zone (Hypothesis 4b). In addition, considering 
time and energy as costs of negotiation, negotiators with positive affect are expected 
to reach agreements relatively faster than those in the control condition (Hypothesis 5). 
Predictions 
The following predictions are the basis of the research design regarding the 
impact of positive affect on the perception of the partner’s cooperativeness, 
information sharing, and perspective taking as well as on integrative negotiation 
outcomes in both positive and negative bargaining zone contexts. 
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Hypothesis 1. People who have experienced positive affect will change their frame 
of the game into more cooperative one in the initial stage of the negotiation. 
Hypothesis 2. People who have experienced positive affect will be more able than 
those in a control condition to overcome their difficulties to share information with 
each other about their respective unique interests.  
Hypothesis 3. People who have experienced positive affect will understand the 
other party’s interests and preferences better than will those in a control condition. 
Hypothesis 4a. People who have experienced positive affect will be better at 
reaching integrative outcomes than will those in a control condition. 
Hypothesis 4b. People who have experienced positive affect will reach more 
integrative solutions than will those in a control condition, and this relationship 
will be stronger in the negative bargaining zone condition.  
Hypothesis 5. People who have experienced positive affect will reach negotiation 
outcomes faster than will those in a control condition. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Present Study 
In order to examine the impact of positive affect on the decision making in a 
negotiation, a negotiation simulation experiment was planned with a 2 X 2 factorial 
design: positive affect condition vs. neutral control condition, and positive bargaining 
zone vs. negative bargaining zone. Participants in all four conditions were told to 
follow instructions given in the role simulation information sheet for a two-party 
negotiation, “Hong Kong Property Deal: An International Negotiation Case 
Simulation”.1  
The main issue in the simulation involves the selling and buying of office space. 
The case appears to have a single distributive issue: the price of the lot. The positive 
and negative bargaining zones were constructed so that seller and buyer have either 
overlapping or non-overlapping price range given their situational information. 
Although this distributive negotiation seems to have one single issue of the price, 
creative options can be invented if mutual interests other than bargaining price are 
explored by the parties. To do so, participants will have to take steps to create value by 
exploring several interests that offer integrative opportunities. People in the positive 
affect condition are expected to be better at sharing their unique information during 
the negotiation and reaching integrative outcomes regardless of bargaining zone 
conditions. In the negative bargaining zone condition, negotiators may reach an 
impasse after finding out they had no overlapping price range. However, negotiators in 
the positive affect conditions are expected to come up with integrative outcomes, since 
they are expected to share more information that can provide them integrative 
potential beyond the decision of the price per se.  
                                                
1 The negotiation role simulation “Hong Kong Property Deal” was written by Larry Crump based on a 
concept first developed by Michael Wheeler and Lawrence Susskind.   
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Method 
Participants Participants were 124 Cornell university students from a variety of 
disciplines. They gave informed consent and received extra credit or five dollars for 
their participation in the research. Participants were randomly assigned to the 
conditions of a 2 (positive vs. neutral affect) X 2 (positive bargaining zone vs. 
negative bargaining zone) factorial design. Participants came in pairs and the pairs 
were assigned to the same affect condition.  
Affect manipulation materials Affect was manipulated by inducing either 
positive or neutral mood state in the first phase of experiment. Twelve pictures that 
were selected from a pre-test were used in the experiment (see Appendix 1). 
Pretest To select pictures for the mood induction, 110 students were asked to 
rate 25 various types of pictures according to the degree of how typical, pleasant, 
unusual, impressive, neutral, meaningful and dull each picture was. Five-point Likert 
scale was used (1-Not at all, 5-Very much) for evaluation. Based on the result of 110 
responses, 6 pictures for each condition were selected to be used in the experiment for 
the mood induction. None of the students who rated pictures in the pretest participated 
in the experiment. 
In order to compare the differences in the effect the pictures can generate, 
results of the t-test of mean ratings for the selected twelve pictures were examined. 
Pictures selected to induce a positive affective state had significantly higher scores for 
pleasantness t(10)=2.07, p<.01, impressiveness t(10)=4.95, p<.01, and meaningfulness 
t(10)=8.10, p<.01 than the pictures selected for the control or neutral mood condition. 
Pictures selected for the control condition had significantly higher scores for 
affectively neutral t(10)=-2.87, p<.05, and dullness t(10)=-9.34, p<.01,. Pictures were 
not significantly different in the ratings of typicality and unusualness.  
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Mood Induction Positive affect was induced by giving each participant a set of 
six pictures which were pre-tested to be positive in valence and asking them to write 
down three words that come to their mind after looking at the picture. The control 
group also received a set of pictures which were neutral in valence and was asked to 
write down their associations with them.   
Manipulation check The remote associates test (RAT) was used as a 
manipulation check after the induction of manipulation. The remote associates test is a 
measure of creativity designed by the Mednicks (Mednick, Mednick, & Mednick, 
1964). Previous research has shown that people in whom positive affect was induced 
perform significantly better on the RAT than those in a neutral group (Isen, Daubman, 
& Nowicki, 1987). Each item consists of three words followed by a blank space and 
the subjects are supposed to fill in the blank with a word that relates to each of three 
words. Participants were asked to solve 11 items, selected among 63 items of modified 
list of remote associate test (Mednick & Mednick, 1967; Bowers, Regehr, Balthazard, 
& Parker, 1990) according to the levels of difficulty. The list of items included 7 
moderately difficult items and 4 difficult items. Self-report on how they felt (happy, 
satisfied, sad, bored) was used as a supplementary tool (see Appendix 2). 
Procedure The basic experimental design involved two between-subject factors 
(positive affect induction vs. control condition, positive vs. negative bargaining zone). 
The randomly paired subjects were brought into the room one pair at a time. An 
experimenter distributed the file that included a set of pictures to the participants and 
explained that these were pre-test materials for future marketing research. Since one 
experimenter administered all sessions, pictures for two affect conditions were kept in 
the same type of file so that the experimenter could be blind to the affect condition the 
participants were in. The experimenter asked them to write down the first three 
associations from the pictures and respond to the questions on their current mood for 
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five minutes. After collecting the pre-test materials, the experimenter explained that 
the experiment was a negotiation simulation between two people. In addition, the 
experimenter told them that for a successful negotiation, problem solving skills are 
necessary and a subset of the remote associates test (RAT) will help to improve these 
skills. Subjects were told that they would have ten minutes to solve a subset of the 
remote associates test. Their performance on this test was later analyzed as a 
manipulation check. After participants finished the remote associates test, the 
experimenter collected the test paper and distributed private information sheets to the 
subjects for the role simulation. Two subjects were randomly assigned to either the 
role of buyer or the role of seller in the negotiation simulation and given five minutes 
to read the instructions. During this preparation, negotiators were not allowed to 
communicate with each other or show their private information sheet to their partner.  
After the five minutes of preparation, the experimenter told the participants that 
they may start a negotiation if they are ready. The experimenter distributed an 
outcome sheet on which participants were instructed to write down the final 
negotiation outcome. The outcome sheet was a blank sheet and negotiators were told 
to write down any outcomes they reached. The experimenter sat in the corner of the 
room and timed their actual negotiation. When they finished their negotiation, the 
experimenter collected the outcome sheet and distributed post-negotiation 
questionnaires. The questionnaire was explained as material for feedback on the 
negotiation process. Upon completing the questionnaires, participants gave it to the 
experimenter and received a debriefing. 
Negotiation simulation 
Materials The negotiation simulation used in this experiment is the “Hong Kong 
Property Deals, ” which is designed in such a way that two negotiators who 
successfully share their unique interests with partners can reach integrative negotiation 
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outcomes. If they do not fully share their unique interests with each other, their 
negotiation outcome will be purely distributive regarding only bargaining price of the 
lot. Possibilities to move beyond the distributive negotiation depend on the 
negotiators’ ability to share information and solve problems in a creative way. If a 
Chinese seller reveals his or her intention to move and expand the business in 
Australia, and an Australian buyer also discloses his or her interests in expanding 
business networks in China, they can find an alternative way to set the price and 
generate mutually beneficial integrative outcomes. Since each party’s information 
sheet contains confidential information about own interests, the only way for 
participants to find out the interests of other negotiator, which are seemingly irrelevant 
to the major issue of bargaining price, is to share this information with their 
negotiating partner. If the people in a positive affect condition consider the game in a 
more integrative frame, overcome the initial fixation effect and see the relevance of 
their own interests to the major issue, they will be more likely to share this 
information to reach better outcomes.   
Manipulation of bargaining zone Manipulation of bargaining zone (Positive vs. 
Negative bargaining zone) was established through the change of the price of the lot 
on the seller side and the limit of the budget on the buyer side. In the positive 
bargaining zone condition, the seller had an alternative buyer willing to pay $50,000 
for the lot and the buyer had budget up to $200,000. In this condition, there was 
positive bargaining zone from $50,000 to $200,000. In contrast, negative bargaining 
zone was created such that there was no overlapping zone in terms of price. The seller 
could sell the lot to the third person for $80,000, while the buyer only had the 
remaining budget up to $75,000. The range of bargaining zone in terms of price of the 
lot did not overlap in the negative bargaining condition unless negotiators found 
integrative solutions to discuss beyond the price. If negotiators could not find out 
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integrative solutions to the issues, they had no choice but to reach an impasse, which is 
a rational, but suboptimal, choice in the case.  
Outcome of Negotiation Measures of negotiation outcome include the price 
agreed on and the value creating options made by the participants. Negotiated price of 
the lot is the result of distributive negotiation, while the value creating options beyond 
the price are outcomes of integrative negotiation. If negotiators successfully share 
their interests, the outcome of the negotiation will include several value creating 
options, and the price can be either higher or lower than what is obtained in a purely 
distributive negotiation, according to the nature of the value creating options. The 
content of value creating options was analyzed by independent raters after the 
negotiations were completed, and the outcomes of negotiation were coded as either 
distributive or integrative. This dichotomous variable for the nature of negotiated 
outcome is limited that it cannot show the degree of integrative negotiations. 
However, it can be used to analyze whether the subject in whom positive affect was 
induced was more likely to achieve integrative negotiation outcomes than the subject 
in a neutral group.  
When the group was not able to agree on the solution in time, their outcome was 
coded as “unfinished” and the content was not included in the analysis. The duration 
of negotiation was measured by the experimenter from the onset of communication 
between negotiators to the point of writing down the outcome.  
Post negotiation questionnaire Post negotiation questionnaires contain items 
about the degree of information sharing, perspective taking, perception of fairness, 
perception of partner’s attitude, satisfaction from the negotiated outcome and the 
mood after the negotiation (see Appendix 3).  
Information Sharing The degree of information sharing was obtained from the 
list of interests on both sides that was given to the subjects after the negotiation 
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practice. Negotiators were told to rate the degree to which they knew about specific 
issues (I did not know-1, I knew very clearly-7) or they revealed these issue during the 
negotiation to their partner using a 7 point scale (I did not disclose at all-1, I revealed 
information very clearly- 7). Question items included are as follows: “To what degree 
did you know about the following information?” “To what degree did you reveal the 
following information regarding your interests?” Each negotiator had 7 pieces of 
specific information on their side to share with the partner, and their responses were 
averaged to construct “Awareness” and “Sharing” scores for each individual 
negotiator. Both scores were compared separately across conditions (Positive affect 
vs. control, positive vs. negative bargaining zone) to look at the degree of information 
sharing according to the conditions. 
Perspective Taking Measures for perspective taking were individual scores 
reflecting how much the subjects understood the order of preference from their 
partners’ perspective. Post negotiation questionnaires included a rating scale for each 
issue. Question items included were as follows: “How much do you think each item 
mattered to your partner? Rate the order of preferences for your partner’s interests.” 
This measured the negotiator’s insight into the other party’s priority for the items. 
Negotiators also rated the order of preferences for their own information, so that the 
index could be compared with the rating from the negotiating partner. If both 
negotiators accurately predicted their partner’s two most important issues, a score 4 is 
given to the pair. If neither negotiator predicted two most important issues to the 
partner, the pair received a score of zero. This score was compared across the 
conditions (Positive affect vs. control, positive vs. negative bargaining zone). 
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CHAPTER 4 
Result 
 
Manipulation Check  Research has been shown that people in the positive affect 
status perform significantly better on the Remote Associate Test (RAT; Isen et al., 
1987; cf. Estrada, Isen, & Young, 1994). Therefore, the Remote Associate Test (RAT) 
items and self-reports of the mood were used to verify the effect of the mood 
induction. Positive affect was successfully induced by looking at the pictures and 
writing down associations with them. Negotiators in the positive affect condition 
performed better on the Remote Associates Test than those in the control condition 
(Mp=4.02 vs. Mc=3.15), F(1,122)=5.62, p<0.05. Supplementary self-reports also 
supported the successful mood induction.  
 
Table 1. Affect Manipulation Check  
 
 Affect Control  Positive Affect F(df) Sig(2-tailed) 
Happy 4.08(1.4) 4.89(0.93) 14.23 (1,122) p<.01 
Satisfied 3.90(1.21) 4.65(1.23) 11.46 (1,122) p<.01 
Sad 2.53(1.53) 1.89(1.12) 7.17(1,122) p<.01 
Bored 2.37(1.53) 1.66(1.02) 9.23(1.122) p<.01 
Number of right 
answers(RAT) 
3.15(2.13) 4.02(1.95) 5.62(1,122) p<.05 
Note. Means for each response category are listed with standard deviation in parentheses.  
Negotiators who were in the positive affect conditions reported that they were 
happier, (Mp=4.89 vs. Mc=4.08), F (1,122) =14.23, p<.01, and were more satisfied (Mp 
=4.65 vs. Mc=3.90), F (1,122) =11.46, p<.01, than did the negotiators in the control 
condition. There was also significant differences in the report of sadness, negotiators 
in the control condition reported their mood more sad (Mc=2.53 vs. Mp =1.89), F 
(1,122) = 7.17, p<.01 than the negotiators in the positive affect condition. Also 
negotiators in the control condition reported their mood as more bored (Mc=2.37 vs. 
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Mp =1.66), F (1,122) =9.23, p<.01 than the negotiators in the positive affect condition 
(Table 1). 
Perceived cooperation  A main effect of positive affect was shown on the perception 
of partner’s attitude. Negotiators in the positive affect condition considered their 
partner significantly more cooperative than those in the control condition, (Mp=5.29, 
s.d.=1.26 vs. Mc =4.55, s.d.=1.63), F(1,120)= 11.516, p<0.001, η2=0.088. It is 
consistent with the first hypothesis that people in the positive affect condition will 
perceive others more cooperatively and see the negotiation as a cooperative rather than 
competitive game. Significant main effect of bargaining zone was also found, 
(Mp=5.36, s.d.=1.31 vs. Mn =4.31 s.d.=1.54), F(1,120)=18.496, p<0.001, η2=0.134. 
There was a significant interaction effect between affect and bargaining zone, 
F(1,120)=5.105, p<0.05, η2=0.041, meaning that negotiators with positive affect 
considered the other party cooperatively even in the negative bargaining zone context, 
while control group negotiators considered the other party more competitively in the 
negative bargaining zone condition (See Table 2 and Figure 1). 
 
Table 2. Mean scores of measures as a function of Affect and Bargaining Zone 
 
 
 
Affect control Positive affect 
 Positive BZ Negative BZ Positive BZ Negative BZ 
Perceived 
cooperation (H1) 
5.31(1.40)a 3.62(1.65)b 5.54(1.33)a 5.00(1.06)a 
Information sharing 
(H2) 
3.13(1.54)a 3.02(0.99)a 2.93(1.47)a 3.03(0.90)a 
Perspective taking 
(H3) 
1.5(0.77)a 1.31(1.08)a 1.44 (1.08)a 2.00(0.8)b 
Time of negotiation 
(H5) 
8.31(5.53)a 8.38(4.34)a 5.92(3.05)b 6.15(2.52)b 
Note.  Means with a different subscript differ at p < .05.  
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Figure 1. Estimated marginal means of partner’s perceived cooperativeness 
 
Information Sharing  Negotiators in the positive affect condition did not share 
significantly more information with the partners, and nor were they more aware of 
their partner’s information than the negotiators in the control condition. Sharing scores 
were not significantly different across the affect condition, F(1,120)=0.147, p>0.05, 
and Awareness scores were also not significantly different across the affect condition, 
F(1,120)=2.985, p>0.05. This result does not support the second hypothesis 
negotiators in a positive affect condition will be more able than those in a control 
condition to overcome their difficulties to share information with each other about 
their respective unique interests. However, this non-significant difference in the 
degree of information sharing should be considered with the time that negotiators in 
both condition spent in a negotiation. As will be shown in the later results, people in 
the positive affect condition reached an agreement significantly faster than those in the 
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control group. Therefore, given this finding, these non-significant differences in the 
degree of information sharing might be interpreted as reflection of one aspect of 
efficient decision making, which is efficient information exchange in a short amount 
of time. 
Perspective taking  There was a significant interaction effect of affect and 
bargaining zone on the degree of perspective taking. Analysis of variance indicated no 
main effect of affect or bargaining zone on the perspective taking, but the interaction 
term was significant, F(1,120)=4.72, p< 0.01, η2=0.038. Negotiators in the positive 
affect condition understood the partner’s perspective better when they faced a negative 
bargaining zone, as compared to those in a control group (See Table 2 and Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Estimated marginal means of Perspective taking   
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Integrative outcomes  Negotiation outcome was coded either as integrative or 
non-integrative. Since this outcome variable is a categorical response, a logistic 
regression model was used to test the effect of positive affect on the negotiation 
outcome (Table 3). 
Table 3. Integrative outcome as a function of Affect and Bargaining Zone 
 B S.E Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
 
  Bargaining 
Zone(NBZ) 
-1.204* .573 4.422 1 0.035 0.300 
  Affect (Positive) 1.253* .521 5.774 1 0.016 0.286 
  Bargaining 
Zone(NBZ) by 
Affect(Positive) 
1.987* .807 6.063 1 0.014 7.292 
  Constant 0 .333 0 1 1.00 1.00 
Note. Reference categories are Bargaining zone (Negative) and Affect (Positive). Integrative 
options=1, non-integrative options=0, *p <.05. Exp(B) represents the ratio change in the odds of 
having integrative options. 
 
Logistic regression analysis including affect, bargaining zone, and the 
interaction term between affect and bargaining zone indicated main effect of positive 
affect on reaching integrative outcome. This results support for the hypothesis 4a that 
people in the positive affect condition were more likely to reach integrative outcomes. 
In addition, a significant interaction effect between affect and bargaining zone was 
found, supporting hypothesis 4b, β=-1.987, Wald=6.063, p<0.05. People in a positive 
affect condition reached more integrative solutions more than those in a control 
condition in the negative bargaining zone condition.  
Time of negotiation  Positive affect was shown to have a main effect on the 
duration of negotiation. One-way analysis of variance yielded main effect of positive 
affect (Mp=5.97, s.d. =2.91 vs. Mc =8.16, s.d. =4.64), (F (1,120) = 9.57, p<0.01, 
η2=0.074), while there was no main effect of bargaining zone or interaction effect. 
Negotiators in the positive affect condition reached an agreement significantly faster 
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than those in the control condition across the bargaining zone conditions (See Table 2 
and Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3. Estimated marginal means of Duration of Negotiation 
 
Additional analysis indicated that there was a significant main effect of 
bargaining zone on the satisfaction with the negotiated outcomes, F(1.120) =4.63, 
p<0.05, η2=0.037, perception of process fairness, F(1.120) =4.61, p<0.05, η2=0.037, 
and mood after the negotiation, F(1.120) =5.11, p<0.05, η2=0.041. People who 
negotiated in the positive bargaining zone were more likely to feel better after the 
negotiation, perceive the process fair, and be satisfied with the negotiation outcomes. 
There was no significant main effect of affect on these variables.  
Contents Analysis of integrative options  Among 62 negotiation outcomes, 20 
were recorded as integrative outcomes. Thirteen pairs of negotiators with positive 
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affect reached integrative outcomes and 7 pairs of negotiators with neutral affect 
reached integrative outcomes. The quality of integrative outcomes was assessed by 
two independent raters, who made judgments on the contents of the integrative 
outcomes. The raters did not know affect or bargaining zone condition of the 
negotiation. The raters received the list of integrative agreements alone and made their 
own independent judgments on how innovative and how elaborate each agreement is 
compared to the agreement on the price only. The inter-rater correlation was high for 
the innovativeness (r =0.7, p<0.01) (M1 = 3.55, s.d. =1.09; M2 = 3.2, s.d. =1.00). 
Therefore, their scores were averaged together (M=3.37, s.d. =0.97).  A high inter-
rater correlation emerged between two rater’s assessment of elaborateness as well 
(r=0.705, p<0.01) (M1 =3.3, s.d. =0.97; M2 = 3.55, s.d. =0.94). With inter-rater 
reliability established, the average score between two rater’s assessment is used for 
further analysis (M= 3.42, s.d. =0.90).  
Independent samples t-test of the mean assessment on the innovativeness and 
elaborateness showed there is significant difference in the mean of innovativeness 
across affect condition. The mean for innovativeness of positive affect condition was 
significantly higher than that of the control group, t(18) =3.913, p<0.01) (M=3.84, 
s.d.=0.82; M=2.5, s.d. =0.5).  The mean for elaborateness of positive affect condition 
was higher than the mean of control group, but difference was not significant (M=3.65, 
s.d. =0.92; M=3.00, s.d. =0.76). Negotiators with positive affect made integrative 
options which were rated significantly higher than those made by negotiators in the 
affect control group. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This study examined the moderating role of bargaining structure on the impact 
of positive affect on negotiation. Consistent with prior research and the first 
hypothesis, results have shown that negotiators in whom positive affect was induced 
perceived others more cooperatively. Although this is not sufficient evidence to show 
that negotiators changed their mental frame of negotiation into more cooperative one 
under the influence of positive affect, there is significant moderating effect to examine 
further. The fact that people in the control condition changed their perception of the 
others according to the bargaining zone condition indicates that bargaining structure 
functioned as a moderator on the perception of the negotiation. While people with 
positive affect generally perceived the other partner slightly more cooperatively in the 
positive bargaining zone context, as compared to negative bargaining zone, people in 
control group were affected significantly more by bargaining structure. It can be 
explained by a multiplying effect of a pre-existing competitive framework of 
negotiation and the negative bargaining zone. While the control group subjects were 
not helped by positive affect to change their mental frame in the beginning of 
negotiations, experiencing a negative bargaining zone made them perceive the 
negotiation as a more competitive and distributive game. These results are related to 
the negotiation outcomes, where control group were able to reach integrative 
outcomes in a positive bargaining zone but not in a negative bargaining zone context.  
In terms of information sharing, non-significant difference on the degree of 
Awareness and Share score should be considered with the result of duration of 
negotiation. As shown in the result section, people in the positive affect condition 
reached the agreement significantly faster than the control group. If following the 
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general assumption that there is a generally linear relationship between time and 
information flow, this non-significant result can be considered as partial support of the 
second hypothesis that people in positive affect condition will share more information. 
In fact, exchanging the similar amount of information within a shorter amount of time 
reflects efficient information sharing. Given the cooperative perception of the 
negotiation, negotiators with positive affect were able to share their information with 
their partner.  
An interesting interaction effect between affect and bargaining zone was found 
on the degree of perspective taking. Negotiators with positive affect understood the 
partner’s perspective better than the control group negotiators in the negative 
bargaining zone condition. It is partially supportive of the third hypothesis that people 
with positive affect would understand the partner’s perspective better than control 
group. In addition, this significant interaction effect provides the mechanisms that can 
explain the results expected in the hypothesis 4b that people who have experienced 
positive affect will be more likely to reach integrative outcomes in the negative 
bargaining zone.   
Most importantly, statistical results suggested that there is a boundary condition 
on the beneficial impact of positive affect mood reaching integrative outcomes. The 
moderating role of bargaining structure functioned so that people with positive affect 
were more likely to reach integrative outcomes when faced with a negative bargaining 
zone, and neutral affect negotiators were more likely to reach integrative outcomes 
when faced with positive bargaining zone. As hypothesized, people with positive 
affect were better at balancing multiple goals than those without positive affect (Isen 
& Reeve, 2005). Considering the fact that the negotiator with positive affect reached 
outcomes significantly faster than the control group, they were balancing the benefits 
and costs of negotiation. In the positive bargaining zone context, negotiators might 
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have not found it necessary to reach integrative outcomes through more option 
generation and information searching after they could agree on mutually satisfactory 
distributive outcome. However in the negative zone context, after finding that it was 
impossible to arrive at satisfactory distributive outcomes, negotiators with positive 
affect tried harder to discover integrative solutions to balance out the time and energy 
they had already invested in the negotiation process. Even in this case, negotiators 
with positive affect states reached integrative outcomes faster than those in the control 
group who ended up with irrational distributive outcomes or impasses. Therefore, 
people with positive affect were efficient decision makers who could consider the 
bargaining structure and the costs simultaneously.   
In addition, the content analysis of integrative outcomes revealed that 
negotiators with positive affect made more innovative options than the affect control 
group. Although the number of groups that reached integrative outcomes was small, 
the significant difference in terms of ratings of the quality of integrative options is 
notable for future research. Considering that positive affect help people to be more 
creative, negotiators with positive affect could reach qualitatively better integrative 
outcomes, even when they were faced with negative bargaining zone.  
Limitations 
This study has its own limitations in terms of design and implication. A single-
issue bargaining task was used in the negotiation in order to clearly identify the role of 
bargaining structure on the relationship between positive affect and negotiation. This 
simple task might lack external validity. However, single-issue bargaining over the 
price of the property is one of several common negotiation practices in everyday life. 
As reflected in the task, there are almost always implicit integrative potential, and it is 
up to negotiators’ ability to realize that potential.  
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APPENDIX 1 
Pictures used for mood induction 
 
Figure 4. Pictures used for positive affect induction 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Pictures used for neutral affect condition  
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Table 4. t-test for equality of means (Pre-test) 
 
 t(df=10) Mean difference Std. Error of 
difference 
Typical -2.1850 -0.7 0.32 
Pleasant 12.374** 2.07 0.17 
Unusual 1.589 0.53 0.33 
Impressive 4.95** 1.64 0.33 
Neutral -2.87* -0.51 0.18 
Meaningful 8.10** 1.22 0.15 
Dull -9.34** -1.33 0.14 
Note. Mean difference between a set of six pictures selected for positive affect manipulation and 
another six pictures selected for affect control group. 
*p <.05. ** p < .01 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Remote Associates Test items used for mood manipulation check 
 
Difficulty  
Triad 
 
Solution p(unsolved) Normalized 
Falling Actor Dust STAR3 .15 -2.38 
Barrel Root Belly BEER2 .50 -0.19 
Mouse Sharp Blue CHEESE1 .55 +0.13 
Sandwich Golf Foot CLUB2 .55 +0.13 
Silk Cream Even SMOOTH2 .55 +0.13 
Strike Same Tennis MATCH2 .60 +0.44 
Rock Times Steel HARD3 .65 +0.63 
Foot Collection Out STAMP2 .70 +1.06 
Magic Plush Floor CARPET2 .70 +1.06 
Stick Light Birthday CANDLE2 .80 +1.69 
Sore Shoulder Sweat COLD1 .90 +2.31 
1From RAT, Form 1 of Mednick & Mednick (1967). 2From Bowers, Regehr, Balthazard, & Parker 
(1990). 3Modified from Bowers et al.(1990). 
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APPENDIX 3 
Post Negotiation Questionnaire 
Questionnaire for those who played the role of T. Jones (Buyer) 
Thank you for your participation. Please take some time to think back about the negotiation you had 
with your partner and answer the following questions. These questions are just for analysis purposes 
and do not have an impact on your negotiation outcomes.  
1. What was your initial bargaining range before the negotiation? 
From $______________ to $ ______________ 
2. During the negotiation, to what extent did you know about the following information held by 
your partner before reaching the final outcome of negotiation? Please circle the number best 
describing your status during the negotiation. 
Information  Did not know                    Knew very 
at all                                clearly 
Wing wants to move to Australia. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Wing wants to sell lot #77. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Wing can sell lot#77 for $80,000 to the other 
person. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Wing bought lot #77 for $70,000 when he 
purchased lot #78. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Wing sold lot#78 to the other businessman he 
knows. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Wing’s business was importing building 
material. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Wing needs $750,000 for immigration visa to 
Australia.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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3. How much are you satisfied with your negotiation agreement? 
          Not at all                                                    Very much satisfied 
                
 
4. To which degree did you reveal the following information regarding your interests? 
5. How much did you think each item mattered to your partner? Rank the order of importance for 
your partner’s interests according to your guess.  
a. Wing wants to move to Australia. 
b. Wing wants to sell lot #77. 
c. Wing can sell lot#77 for $80,000 to the other person. 
d. Wing bought lot #77 for $70,000 when he purchased lot #78. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Information  Did not know                    Knew very 
at all                                clearly 
You do not like current office space. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
You want to have a Chinese network for 
future business. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
You want to expand your office space. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Your company is doing well in Hong Kong. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Your company plans to expand the business 
in Hong Kong.. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
You have extra budget up to $75,000. 
($200,000 for Positive bargaining zone 
condition) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
You know the price of lot 77 Wing paid in 
1990.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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e. Wing sold lot#78 to the other businessman he knows. 
f. Wing’s business is importing building material. 
g. Wing needs $750,000 for immigration visa to Australia. 
 
6. Please rank the order of importance for following information.  
a. You do not like current office space. 
b. You want to have a Chinese network for future business. 
c. You want to expand your office space. 
d. Your company is doing well in Hong Kong. 
e. Your company plans to expand the business in Hong Kong. 
f. You have extra budget up to $75,000. ($200,000 for Positive bargaining zone) 
g. You know the price of lot #77 Wing paid in 1990. 
 
7.  What do you think of your partner’s attitudes towards the negotiation? 
                       Very competitive                                              Very cooperative 
        
 
8. Do you think the negotiation process was fair? 
 Not at all                                                             Very much 
                
 
9. How do you feel at the moment? 
         
         Not good at all                                                    Very good 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Questionnaire for those who played the role of L. Wing (Seller) 
 
Thank you for your participation. Please take some time to think back about the negotiation you had 
with your partner and answer the following questions. These questions are just for analysis purposes 
and do not have an impact on your negotiation outcomes.  
1. What was your initial bargaining range before the negotiation? 
From $______________ to $ ______________ 
2. During the negotiation, to what extent did you know about the following information held by 
your partner before reaching the final outcome of negotiation? Please circle the number best 
describing your status during the negotiation.  
 
 
Information  Did not know                    Knew very 
at all                                clearly 
Jones does not like current office space. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Jones wants to have a Chinese network for 
future business. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Jones wants to expand his office space. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Jones’s company is doing well in Hong Kong. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Jones’s company plans to expand the business 
in Hong Kong. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Jones has extra budget up to $75,000. 
($200,000 for Positive bargaining zone) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Jones knows the price of lot #77 you paid in 
1990. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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3. How much are you satisfied with your negotiation agreement?   
       Not at all                                                  Very much satisfied 
                
 
4. To which degree did you reveal the following information regarding your interests?   
 
5. How much did you think each item mattered to your partner? Rank the order of importance for 
your partner’s interests according to your guess.  
 
a. Jones does not like current office space. 
b. Jones wants to have a Chinese network for future business. 
c. Jones wants to expand his office space. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
              Information  
Did not share            Shared                      
at all                Very clearly               
You want to move to Australia. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
You want to sell lot #77. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
You can sell lot#77 for $80,000 to the other 
person. ($50,000 for Positive bargaining zone) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
You bought lot #77 for $70,000 when you 
purchased lot #78. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
You sold the lot#78 to the other businessman 
you know. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Your business is importing building material. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
You need $750,000 for immigration visa to 
Australia.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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d. Jones’s company is doing well in Hong Kong. 
e. Jones’s company plans to expand the business in Hong Kong. 
f. Jones has extra budget up to $75,000. 
g. Jones knows the price of lot #77 you paid in 1990. 
 
6. Please rank the order of importance for following information.  
a. You want to move to Australia. 
b. You want to sell lot #77. 
c. You can sell lot#77 for $80,000 to the other person. 
d. You bought lot #77 for $70,000 when you purchased lot #78. 
e. You sold lot#78 to the other businessman. 
f. Your business is importing building material. 
g. You need $750,000 for immigration visa to Australia. 
7. What do you think of your partner’s attitudes towards the negotiation? 
                 Very competitive                                                   Very cooperative 
                
 
8. Do you think the negotiation process was fair? 
              Not at all                                                         Very much 
                
 
9. How do you feel at the moment? 
         Not good at all                                                  Very good 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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